Discovered by Goldberg Security Research. Reported to Microsoft via the Zero Day Initiative on 2025-12-05. Coordinated public disclosure on 2026-03-10. Credited anonymously through ZDI.
Summary
A use-after-free in the Windows NDIS driver (ndis.sys) allows a local attacker
with low-privilege code execution to escalate to kernel context. The driver fails to validate
that an object still exists before operating on it — a freed object is accessed through
a stale reference, and an attacker who controls the contents of the reallocated memory gets
arbitrary kernel code execution.
The vulnerability
NDIS (Network Driver Interface Specification) is a core Windows kernel component that sits
between network protocol drivers and network adapter miniport drivers. ndis.sys
runs in kernel mode on every Windows installation.
The flaw is a missing object lifetime check. A code path in ndis.sys retains a
reference to an object and later operates on it without verifying it has not been freed. If
the object is freed between the reference acquisition and the use, the driver dereferences a
pointer into freed pool memory. An attacker who can trigger the free and reclaim the
allocation with controlled data achieves arbitrary code execution in kernel context.
The attack requires local access and the ability to run low-privileged code, but no special permissions beyond that. The CVSS scope is Changed (S:C) because the compromise crosses from user mode into the kernel trust boundary.
Impact
- Privilege escalation: a low-privilege local user escalates to SYSTEM / kernel.
- Kernel code execution: the attacker executes arbitrary code in kernel context, with full control over the operating system.
- Scope: every Windows installation running a vulnerable version of
ndis.sysis affected. NDIS is not optional — it is a core networking component.
Discovery context
This vulnerability was found during kernel driver research conducted as part of our ongoing work on low-level Windows internals. The same kernel-level expertise that goes into building our in-house VT-x research hypervisor — understanding NDIS structures, pool allocations, object lifecycles and driver interaction patterns — is what surfaces bugs like this one.
The bug was reported to Microsoft through the Zero Day Initiative's responsible disclosure programme. ZDI assigned it ZDI-CAN-28381 (published as ZDI-26-184). Microsoft patched it in their March 2026 security update.
Remediation
- Apply the Microsoft security update from March 2026.
- No workaround —
ndis.syscannot be disabled without breaking all network functionality.
Timeline
- 2025-12-05 — Vulnerability reported to Microsoft via ZDI.
- 2026-03-10 — Coordinated public disclosure. Microsoft releases patch.